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In this thought-provoking book, Richard Healey proposes a new interpretation
of quantum theory inspired by pragmatist philosophy. Healey puts forward the
interpretation as an alternative to realist quantum theories on the one hand such
as Bohmian mechanics, spontaneous collapse theories, and many-worlds interpre-
tations, which are different proposals for describing what the quantum world is
like and what the basic laws of physics are, and non-realist interpretations on the
other hand such as quantum Bayesianism, which proposes to understand quantum
theory as describing agents’ subjective epistemic states. The central idea of Healey’s
proposal is to understand quantum theory as providing not a description of the
physical world but a set of authoritative and objectively correct prescriptions about
how agents should act. The book provides a detailed development and defense of
that idea, and it contains interesting discussions about a wide range of philosoph-
ical issues such as representation, probability, explanation, causation, objectivity,
meaning, and fundamentality.
Healey’s project is at the intersection of physics and philosophy. The book is
divided into two parts. Part I of the book discusses the foundational questions in
quantum theory from the perspective of the prescriptive interpretation. In Part II,
Healey discusses the philosophical implications of the view. Both parts are written
in a way that is largely accessible to non-specialists. In this brief book review, I will
focus on two questions:
(1) How does Healey’s idea work?
(2) What reasons are there to believe in it?
To understand Healey’s ideas, we should provide some background for non-
specialists. Quantum theory has been subject to intense scrutiny and philosophical
investigations in the last century. There has been enormous progress on several
fronts, including the empirical tests about Bell inequalities and the development
of several realist interpretations. It has been proposed that what is revolutionary
about quantum theory and what sets it apart from classical physics are quantum
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entanglement and quantum non-locality. For many realists, it seems that quantum
theory requires us to postulate a different kind of ontology and a different kind of
laws of nature.
Quantum entanglement describes the holistic phenomena that there are physical
properties that can be attributed to a composite system that are not the product of
properties of its parts. For example, two electrons A and B are entangled when the
pair has a quantum state that is not the product of the state of A and the state of B.
Quantum entanglement is reflected in the way quantum states, which are typically
represented by “wave functions,” get assigned to different systems.
Quantum non-locality (also called “spooky action at a distance”) describes the
phenomena that events that are arbitrarily far apart can influence each other and the
strength of the influence does not depend on their distance. Quantum non-locality is
a strange feature, and its falsity was assumed in the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (1935)
argument for the incompleteness of quantum theory. Remarkably, Bell (1964) proved
that if the quantum predictions are accurate, then nature is non-local. Subsequent
experimental tests since the 1980s have verified the quantum predictions to a high
level of precision, reinforcing the conclusion that nature is non-local.1
Both Bohmian mechanics and spontaneous collapse theories are non-local. And
all three realist theories affirm the reality of quantum entanglement. The reality
of quantum entanglement follows from the reality of the quantum state. After all,
the quantum state is so successful in application. If one wants to be a realist, it
seems that the most natural way is to accept the reality of the quantum state and its
consequences. But what is represented by the wave function? What is its nature?
How does it relate to things in the physical world? A hot topic in recent work in
philosophy of physics concerns exactly those questions.2
I think the key to understand Healey’s idea is to think of it as a proposal for the
proper foundation of quantum theory—a proposal to replace descriptive facts with
normative facts as the foundation, and to replace “what there is” with “what we
ought to expect.” Healey’s approach would sound alien to many people, since it is
not realist in any traditional sense. It is common to think that fundamental physics,
and in particular quantum theory, is in the business of saying what the world is like
(even though it may be difficult to discern what it says). It is true that we can learn
useful advice from a correct physical theory, such as:
• One should avoid falling into a black hole.
• One should place detectors far from sources of interference.
• One should get away from a nuclear explosion.
• One should be almost certain to see this particle decay in 1 month.
A correct physical theory may explain the correctness of useful practical advices
such as above. Such advices are objectively correct in so far as they are derived from
1See Maudlin (2011) for a detailed discussion of these issues.
2See Chen (2019) for an overview.
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the conjunction of some accurate descriptions of physical reality and some correct
theories of human rationality.3 For Healey, that might be a good interpretation of
classical physics, but that is not the right interpretation of quantum theory. Quantum
theory, for Healey, directly offers authoritative advice about what we should believe
and expect, and such advice is not derived in any way from some underlying
descriptive facts. Still, such advice can be objectively true (unlike the quantum
Bayesian’s emphasis on subjective epistemic states). The advice has the form “one
should assign quantum state ψ to the physical system s,” and “one should have 0.5
confidence in M,” where M is some kind of magnitude claim about the physical
system s. On Healey’s interpretation, quantum theory is about such advice, not
some descriptions about what nature is like. Although the magnitude claims are
descriptions of nature, they are not contained in quantum theory. Instead, they
are assumed to be the targets of explanation, and they are somewhat prior to the
application of quantum theory. However, they will be suitably constrained by
quantum theory, and only a subclass of them will be empirically significant.
There are many parts to Healey’s proposal. To simplify our discussions below,
here is a short summary of the key points (mostly from Chapter 5):
• Advice on state assignments: agents should follow the standard practice in
quantum physics and assign an appropriate quantum state (e.g. a wave func-
tion ψ) to a system relative to their physical situation.
• Magnitude claims: a canonical magnitude claim has the form “the value of
dynamical variable M on physical system s lies in set ∆.” One example would
be “the position of the particle is on the left side of the box.” Magnitude claims
are assumed in the theory and they are the targets of explanation. (See §5.2
and §12.3 for elaborations.)
• Empirical significance: a magnitude claim is empirically significant if the
relevant quantum state the agent should assign to the system has properly
experienced decoherence due to interactions with the environment, where de-
coherence is a mathematical property of the quantum state. (See §5.2 and
Appendix C for more on decoherence).
• Advice on credences: agents should adopt credences about empirically signifi-
cant magnitude claims according to the Born rule (setting one’s credence about
an empirically significant magnitude claim to be the squared modulo of the
appropriate wave function).
• Descriptions of nature: none of the above, except for the magnitude claims,
describes anything in nature. However, magnitude claims are not contained
or entailed by quantum theory. They are given prior to the theory.
Let us walk through a simple example. Suppose our physicist Alice sets up an
experiment for the position measurement of a particle s. Alice wants to explain
3For example, one should avoid dangerous activities, minimize errors, and maximize epistemic
accuracy.
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some magnitude claim about the particle’s position (say that it is on the left side
of the box). Quantum theory tells her that she ought to assign a particular wave
function ψ to the particle. (The magnitude claim about the particle’s position will
only become empirically significant when the particle has appropriately interacted
with the environment such that different parts of the wave function are almost
separated into macroscopically distinct regions as described by decoherence.) Her
expectation about the (empirically significant) magnitude claim should match the
probability given by the Born rule, which is the squared modulo of the wave function
at this moment.
Many questions arise at this point. For example: what makes a particular quan-
tum state assignment appropriate? It is standard to assume that a state assignment
is appropriate or correct in virtue of representational accuracy, that is, the system
indeed has the particular quantum state. But Healey disagrees; it is more or less a
basic fact and if we want to explain it we can appeal to the practice within the sci-
entific community, not some metaphysical facts about what nature is like. It seems
to me that on Healey’s project the correctness of state assignments is a fundamental
normative fact, and any further inquiry about it may be a meta-normative project.
This sheds light on how Healey tries to solve (or dissolve) traditional problems in
quantum foundation. In the following, we discuss how Healey applies his inter-
pretation to the quantum measurement problem, quantum entanglement, and Bell
non-locality.
The quantum measurement problem is often presented as an inconsistency
among three propositions: (1) the quantum state is a complete description of na-
ture; (2) the quantum state always changes according to some unitary equation (e.g.
the Schrödinger equation); (3) experiments have determinate (unique) outcomes.
Applying this to the above experimental set up involving Alice, we can derive a
contradiction. If the quantum state is complete and it changes unitarily, then quan-
tum theory implies there is no determinate outcome of the position measurement
of the particle, since it will always be in a superposition of ψleft and ψright, which is in-
consistent with (3)—the particle is measured to be either on the left side or the right
side of the box. For Healey, (1) and (2) are simply non-starters, and (3) is obviously
true, which means that there is no problem to begin with. (See §6 and especially
p.99.) Quantum theory is prescriptive and it is mistaken to think that the quantum
state describes the world, much less describing it completely. Moreover, in typical
measurement contexts, such as in Alice’s case, the appropriate quantum state has
decohered after measurement, giving Alice permission to apply the Born rule to
make probabilistic predictions. There is a determinate outcome of measurement,
but it is not entailed or contained in quantum theory. Instead, determinate outcomes
are something confirmed by our direct experiences. Furthermore, if the outcome
were not determinate, quantum theory would lose its empirical justification. So in
order to apply quantum theory, we have to assume that experimental outcomes are
unique and determinate (in typical cases). This stands in sharp contrast to other
single-world theories such as Bohmian mechanics and spontaneous collapse theo-
ries that aim to justify (3) from a physical point of view. They seek to derive (3)
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as a theorem, by applying the precise mathematical equations to the microscopic
ontology.
For Healey, quantum entanglement is no longer metaphysically revolutionary.
State assignments may be entangled and non-separable in the sense that the com-
plete state of the system does not supervene on the states of its parts. However, it
seems that Healey would say that the supervenience has no metaphysical signifi-
cance but only normative significance. The advice about which state to assign to
the whole system does not supervene, in general, on any advice on what to assign
to the parts.
Healey thinks that Bell non-locality becomes more digestible on the prescriptive
view (§4). Healey does not dispute Bell’s proof as a demonstration of the existence of
non-local correlations, i.e. probabilities of events happening in region A may depend
on events happening in region B which can be arbitrarily far away from A. But
Healey does not think non-local correlations imply non-local influences or causation.
What Bell’s theorem (and the subsequent empirical tests) really shows is that the
quantum probability of an event localized in some region must be “relativized to
arbitrarily distant places and times.” But why should we think such a thing is true?
It is standard to infer there is some goings-on in the world that accounts for the
non-local correlations—some kind of underlying physical mechanism of non-local
influence. For example, the mechanism is accounted for, in explicit physical details,
by the guidance equation in Bohmian mechanics and the collapse mechanism in
spontaneous collapse theories. But that is a mistake from Healey’s perspective.
Quantum theory postulates such non-local correlations as reliable prescriptions for
agents who want to use quantum theory successfully, and it is a mistake to try to
describe in virtue of what do such correlations obtain.
What are the reasons for accepting Healey’s new interpretation of quantum
theory? I think the main reason, for Healey, is that it allows us to avoid the surprising
metaphysical consequences such as non-locality and the reality of the quantum state.
But at what costs? If Healey is right, then quantum theory is no longer in the business
of describing nature. For most people, I think, that would be too costly.
What about alternatives to Healey’s theory? How do they compare to it? Healey
gives reasons for thinking that they are inadequate (§7). He thinks that spontaneous
collapse theories are too speculative, and that they do not qualify as “interpreta-
tions.” He suggests that many-worlds theories still face the conceptual problems
of probability and emergence of macroscopic branches. He notes that Bohmian
mechanics faces problems in relativistic contexts. Interestingly, Healey’s objection
to Bohmian mechanics is that it would postulate theoretical structure (e.g. preferred
foliation of space-time, particle motion, and the universal wave function) that is
empirically inaccessible. Healey does not discuss whether these are more costly
than abandoning the descriptive role of quantum theory, but I think he would say
so. It is important to note that all of them are not only candidate descriptions of
nature but are also in principle applicable to the universe as a whole, while Healey’s
interpretation would not be, since on his theory, the application of Born rule is only
appropriate when there is environmental decoherence (and the universe as a whole
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by definition has no external environment to interact with) (p. 227).4
As is the case with Healey’s previous books, this one contains many interesting
and controversial ideas, which will generate much debate in the years to come.
Above all, Healey should be applauded for writing a clear, accessible, and engaging
introduction to the prescriptive interpretation of quantum theory. There are many
issues that Healey discusses at length in the book that I do not have space to comment
on. Even though we may not agree on the truth of the matter, we can certainly agree
that Healey’s book will be useful to anyone interested in the intersection of physics
and philosophy.
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